This is a discussion on Re: small patch to etc/skel/dot.cshrc within the mailing.openbsd.tech forums, part of the OpenBSD category; --> On 17 Feb 2004, eric wrote: | On Tue, 2004-02-17 at 18:09:38 -0500, James Larkby-Lahet proclaimed... | | > ...
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| On 17 Feb 2004, eric wrote: | On Tue, 2004-02-17 at 18:09:38 -0500, James Larkby-Lahet proclaimed... | | > This is not a security issue, if that what you are thinking, because | > the paths are searched in order. all the normal binary directories are | > listed first, so no one can slip you a trojaned 'ls' or whatever in the | > current directory. Completely removing '.' from your path is an | > overkill solution. and annoying :-) | | Paranoid, yes. Annoying? I'd beg to differ. I've seen several | sysadmin's accidentally screw up the order and put "." further up | the PATH chain. How about adding just a little commented mark | educating users to leave it at the end? | | I'll quit beating a dead horse now either way. Just wasn't sure if | it was something overlooked I also think '.' should be remove from the PATH. Example: - imagine an evil hacker places a binary (trojan...) called 'sl' in /tmp - if '.' is in the default PATH, the hacker would just have to wait long enough so that a user (whose cwd happens to be /tmp) mistypes 'sl' (instead of 'ls') so that it executes the trojan This simple attack is really used by the bad guys and works very well on massively multiuser systems. -- Marc Bevand http://www.epita.fr/~bevand_m Computer Science School EPITA - System, Network and Security Dept. |